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Abstract
We consider the economic lot-sizing (ELS) game with general concave ordering cost.
In this cooperative game, multiple retailers form a coalition by placing joint orders to a
single supplier in order to reduce ordering cost. When both the inventory holding cost
and backlogging cost are linear functions, it can be shown that the core of this game is
non-empty. The main contribution of this paper is to show that a core allocation can
be computed in polynomial time.
Our approach is based on linear programming (LP) duality and is motivated by
the work of Owen [19]. We suggest an integer programming formulation for the ELS
problem and show that its LP relaxation admits zero integrality gap, which makes it
possible to analyze the ELS game by using LP duality. We show that, there exists an
optimal dual solution that defines an allocation in the core.
An interesting feature of our approach is that it is not necessarily true that every
optimal dual solution defines a core allocation. This is in contrast to the duality
approach for other known cooperative games in the literature.
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1 Introduction
In the basic economic lot-sizing model (ELS), a retailer is facing a demand for a single
product that occurs during each of a consecutive time periods, which can be satisfied by
orders at that period or at pervious periods. The objective is to decide the order quantity at
each time period so that the demand is satisfied at a minimum total cost, including ordering
cost and inventory holding cost.
In a slightly more general model, referred to as ELS with backlogging, demand of a period
can be backlogged and be fulfilled by orders at later periods. At any period, the unfulfilled
demand incurs penalty cost, called backlogging cost. Throughout the paper, we assume that
backlogging is allowed.
We consider a situation where multiple retailers sell the same product, which is ordered
from a single manufacturer. In a decentralized system, each retailer would solve an ELS
problem. However, by exploiting economies of scale, the retailers may find it beneficial to
form coalitions and place joint orders. One important issue that we are concerned with is
how to allocate the cost or profit in such a way that is considered advantageous by all the
retailers, i.e., no retailer(s) gain more by deviating from the cooperation. This naturally
gives rise to a cooperative game, referred to as the ELS game, and the cost allocation we
are interested in can be studied by using concepts from the cooperative game theory. In this
paper, we mainly focus on the core of the ELS game.
A special case of the ELS game, where backlogging is not allowed and the ordering cost
includes a fixed setup cost and a linear cost, has been recently analyzed by van den Heuvel
et al. [30]. Specifically, they showed for this special case that the core is always nonempty by
invoking the well-known Bondareva-Shapley theorem [2, 24]. They also studied the concavity
of the ELS game.
In this paper, we focus on core allocations of the ELS game under general conditions.
Specifically, our model allows for backlogging and general concave ordering cost. We prove
the existence of a core allocation for the general ELS game. Our main contribution is to
show that an allocation in the core can be computed in polynomial time by solving a linear
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program. We would like to point out that this computational issue is not addressed by van
den Heuvel et al. [30], as the Bondareva-Shapley theorem, to some extent, provides only an
existence proof of a core allocation.
Our approach is based on linear programming (LP) duality, and is inspired by the
work of Owen [19], who used LP duality to show the non-emptiness of the core for a class
of linear production games. Owen’s approach has been applied and/or extended to other
cooperative games; see, for instance, Granot [10], Tamir [28], and Goemans and Skutella [9].
One scheme commonly seen in all these approaches is that one first formulates the underlying
optimization problem of the cooperative game as a linear program, and then use the dual
variables to define an allocation that can be proven in the core. In fact, for all these games,
the set of allocations defined by optimal dual variables, often referred to as Owen set, is
always a subset of the core (see Samet and Zemel [23] for the relationship between Owen set
and the core).
One may formulate the ELS problem with concave ordering cost as a facility location
problem. The LP relaxation of such a formulation always has an integral solution, i.e., there
is no integrality gap between the integer program and its LP relaxation. This fact allows
us to show the existence of a core allocation of the ELS game by directly applying Owen’s
approach. However, the size of the LP relaxation is not necessarily polynomial in the input
of the game. Thus, this approach does not provide a polynomial time algorithm for finding
a core allocation of the ELS game with general concave ordering cost. Instead, we suggest
an alternative integer programming formulation for the ELS problem whose LP relaxation
always has an integral solution as well.
We would like to point out an interesting feature of our approach, that is in contrast to
the duality approach for other known cooperative games in the literature. On the one hand,
allocations defined by some optimal solutions to the dual of the LP relaxation may not be in
the core of the ELS game. On the other hand, there always exists an optimal dual solution
that defines an allocation in the core, which can be found in polynomial time.
Our analysis is based on the fact that there always exists an optimal dual solution that
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has certain monotonicity. Such a property is quite intuitive and might be interesting on its
own.
The topic of this paper also falls into a stream of recent research on applying cooperative
game theory in the area of inventory management. One type of such games is related to
inventory centralization under demand uncertainty [11, 12]. In the simplest model, which is
called the newsvendor game [13], we consider a set of retailers, who face random demands of
a single product. The retailers place a joint order before observing the demands, and after
the demands are realized, the inventory is optimally allocated to the retailers. Hartman et
al. [13] first show that under certain condition of the demand distribution, the newsvendor
game has a non-empty core. This result is subsequently generalized by a series of recent
papers: by Mu¨ller et al. [18], Slikker et al. [25], Slikker et al. [26], and Ozen et al. [20].
Finally, Chen and Zhang [5] unified and generalized these existence results by using duality
of stochastic linear programming, and suggest a way to compute an allocation in the core.
Another type of inventory games has been studied by Meca et al. [17], which is closely
related to the game studied in our paper. In both games, the retailers cooperate in order to
reduce ordering cost. The major difference is that, in the game studied in [17], the underlying
optimization problem is the Economic Ordering Quantity (EOQ) model, while in ours it is
the ELS model. More general models have recently been studied by Dror and Hartman [7],
and Anily and Haviv [1].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Cooperative Games
Here we briefly introduce some basic concepts of cooperative game theory that will be used in
this paper; see Peleg and Sudho¨lter [21] for more details. Let N = {1, 2 · · · , n} be the set of
players. A collection of players S ⊆ N is called a coalition. The set N is sometimes referred
to as the grand coalition. A characteristic cost function F (S) is defined for each coalition
S ⊆ N , which could be the minimum total cost that coalition S should pay if the members
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of S decide to secede from the grand coalition and cooperate only among themselves. A
cooperative game is determined by the pair (N,F ). For each subset S ⊂ N , the cooperative
game (S, F ) is called a subgame.
In cooperative games with transferable cost, the cost of a coalition S can be transferred
between the players of S. In such games a coalition S can be completely characterized by
F (S). The coalition is allowed to split the cost F (S) among its members in any possible
way.
A vector l = (l1, l2, · · · , lN) is called an allocation for the game (N,F ) if
∑
j∈N lj =
F (N). The core of a cooperative game is a solution concept which requires that no subset
of players has an incentive to secede.
Definition 1. An allocation l is in the core of the game (N,F ), if
∑
j∈N lj = F (N) and for
any subset S ⊆ N , ∑j∈S lj ≤ F (S).
There are several interesting questions related to the core of a cooperative game (N,F ).
In particular, we would like to know whether the core of (N,F ) is non-empty or not, and if
yes, how to design an algorithm to find a core allocation efficiently. The first question may
be answered by the Bondareva-Shapely theorem, which we introduce below.
We call any collection B of coalitions balanced if there exists a vector of positive weights
(λS : S ∈ B) such that ∑
S∈B:i∈S
λS = 1 ∀i ∈ N.
Here (λS : S ∈ B) is referred to as a vector of balancing weights. We call the game (N,F )
balanced if for any balanced collection of coalitions B and the corresponding balancing weights
(λS : S ∈ B), we have ∑
S∈B
λSF (S) ≥ F (N).
It is that, due to Bondareva [2] and Shapley [24], a cooperative game has a non-empty
core if and only if it is balanced. Thus, in order to show a cooperative game has a non-
empty core, it is sufficient to show the game is balanced by invoking the Bondareva-Shapley
theorem. However, in general this approach does not provide an efficient way to compute a
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core allocation. Finding core allocations efficiently often gives rise to interesting algorithmic
problems.
Another important concept in game is concavity. A cooperative game (N,F ) is called a
concave game if for every pair of subsets S, T ⊆ N , F (S)+F (T ) ≥ F (S ∪T )+F (S ∩T ). It
is well-known that the core of a concave game is always non-empty. Also, a core allocation
of a concave game can be computed in polynomial time by using ellipsoid algorithm for
linear programming. Moreover, every concave game has a population monotonic allocation
scheme, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2. (adopted from Sprumont [27]) A vector l = (lSi )i∈S,S⊂N is a population mono-
tonic allocation scheme of the cooperative game (N,F ) if and only if it satisfies the following
conditions:
• the vector (lSi )i∈S is in the core of the subgame (S, V ), and
• for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N , lSi ≥ lTi .
Intuitively, a population monotonic allocation scheme gives an allocation vector for each
subgame such that the cost allocation to each individual participating the subgame is non-
increasing with the set of players participating in the subgame.
For non-concave game, a population monotonic allocation scheme may still exist. But
finding such an allocation could be very challenging.
2.2 The Economic Lot-Sizing Problem
The basic economic lot-sizing model was proposed by Manne [16] and Wagner and Whitin
[31]. In this model, demand for a single product occurs during each of T consecutive time
periods numbered through 1 to T . The demand of a given time period can be satisfied
by orders at that period or at pervious periods, i.e., back-logging is not allowed. The
model includes ordering cost and inventory holding cost. The objective is to decide the
order quantity at each time period so that the demand is satisfied at a minimum total cost.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that the initial inventory is zero and lead time is also
zero.
The ELS model considered in this paper was proposed by Zangwill [33], which allows
that the demand of a period to be backlogged for some periods, provided that it is satisfied
eventually by orders at subsequent periods. At any period, the unfulfilled demand incurs
penalty cost refereed to as backlogging cost.
In order to present a mathematical formulation for the economic lot-sizing problem, we
introduce the following notations. In particular, for each t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T , define
• dt: the amount of demand in period t, which is assumed to be an integer;
• zt: the order quantity at period t, which is called an ordering period if zt > 0;
• I+t : the amount of (non-negative) inventory at the end of period t;
• I−t : the amount of backlogged demand at period t;
• ct(zt): the cost of ordering zt units at period t;
• h+t : the unit cost of holding inventory at the end of period t;
• h−t : the unit cost of having backlogged demand at period t.
The following mathematical formulation is sometimes called the flow formulation for the
economic lot-sizing problem:
C(d) := min
∑
1≤t≤T
{
ct(zt) + h
+
t I
+
t + h
−
t I
−
t
}
s.t. zt + I
+
t−1 − I−t−1 = dt + I+t − I−t ,∀ t = 1, . . . , T,
I+0 = I
−
0 = 0,
zt ≥ 0, I+t ≥ 0, I−t ≥ 0 ∀t = 1, . . . , T,
(1)
where d = (d1, d2, . . . , dT )
T is a vector in RT , and the first constraint is the inventory balance
equation.
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We assume that the ordering cost function ct(·) is non-decreasing and concave with
ct(0) = 0. Under the concavity assumption, problem (1) is a concave minimization problem
over a polyhedron. Therefore, there exists an optimal solution that is an extreme point of
the polyhedron. It follows that, as proved by [33], there exists an optimal solution to (1)
with the following properties:
a): I+t−1 > 0 implies zt = 0,
b): zt > 0 implies I
−
t = 0, and
c): I+t−1 > 0 implies I
−
t = 0.
Define any period for which I+t = I
−
t = 0 as a regeneration period. Then the above
properties imply that there exists an optimal solution to (1) such that there is always a
regeneration period between two ordering periods. An optimal solution with such structure
can be found in polynomial time [33].
2.3 The Economic Lot-Sizing Game
We consider a set of retailers N = {1, 2, · · · , n}, all of which sell the same product and face
an economic lot-sizing problem. For each i ∈ N , let di = (di1, di2, . . . , diT ), where dit is the
known demand of retailer i in time period t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T . We assume that the ordering cost,
inventory holding cost, and backlogging cost are independent of retailers.
The retailers can place orders individually, i.e., each of them solves an economic lot-
sizing problem separately to satisfy its own demand. They can also cooperate by placing
joint orders and keeping inventory at a central warehouse. For a collection of retailers S ⊂ N ,
the goal is to minimize the total cost for the coalition, while the aggregated demand being
satisfied.
As the ordering cost is a concave function of the ordering quantity, it is not hard to see
that it leads to cost reduction if the retailers place joint orders. Therefore, a cooperative
game can be defined in this setting. It is called the economic lot-sizing game (N,F ).
In this game, the grand coalition is the set of retailers N . For each subset S ⊆ N ,
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the characteristic cost function F (S) is defined by F (S) = C(dS), where C(·) is defined by
optimization problem (1), dS = (dS1 , d
S
2 , . . . , d
S
T ), and d
S
t =
∑
i∈S d
i
t for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Although our main result for the economic lot sizing game is concerned with the case
where ct(·) is a general concave function, we are also interested in an important special class
of the economic lot sizing games, referred to as ELS games with setup cost. In this class of
games, the ordering cost function has a fixed cost component and a variable cost component,
that is, ct(zt) = Ktδ(zt) + ctzt where
δ(x) =
 1, if x > 0;0, otherwise. (2)
Notice that this cost function is also commonly used in the literature on inventory theory.
2.4 Concavity of the Economic Lot-Sizing Game
Recall that we are interested in proving the non-emptiness of the core and finding an alloca-
tion in the core. It is well known that, for a concave game, the core is always nonempty, there
exist polynomial time algorithms to find an allocation in the core, and to check whether an
allocation is in the core or not. In other words, we have satisfactory answers to the questions
of interest when a cooperative game is concave. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether the
economic lot sizing game (N,F ) is concave or not.
van den Heuvel et al. [30] has shown that the economic lot-sizing game with setup cost
(not general concave ordering cost) is concave when T = 2 and is not concave when T ≥ 5.
We strengthen their result in the following theorem.
Proposition 1. The economic lot-sizing game (N,F ) is not concave when T ≥ 3.
Proof. It suffices to construct an example with T = 3 such that F (·) is not submodular.
In the following example, there are three players, i.e., N = {1, 2, 3}. The demands of the
players are given as
d1 = (1, 1, 1), d2 = (0, ², 0), and d3 = (0, 0, ²).
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We assume backlogging is not allowed. Also, we let the holding cost for every period be zero,
and the ordering costs are defined by (2), where
K1 = K2 = K3 = 3/2, c1 = 2, c2 = 1, and c3 = 0.
Under this cost structure, it is easy to verify that, for any demand (d1, d2, d3) with d1 > 0,
the optimal cost is
C(d1, d2, d3)
= K1 + c1d1+
min (c1(d2 + d3), K2 + c2(d2 + d3), c1d2 +K3 + c3d3, K2 + c2d2 +K3 + c3d3)
= 3/2 + 2d1 +min (2(d2 + d3), 3/2 + (d2 + d3), 3/2 + 2d2, 3 + d2) .
Therefore, for ² > 0 sufficiently small, we have
F ({1}) = C(1, 1, 1) = 7
F ({1, 2}) = C(1, 1 + ², 1) = 7 + ²
F ({1, 3}) = C(1, 1, 1 + ²) = 7
F ({1, 2, 3}) = C(1, 1 + ², 1 + ²) = 7 + 2²,
which follows that
F ({1}) + F ({1, 2, 3}) > F ({1, 2}) + F ({1, 3}).
Thus, the game (V,N) is not concave. ¤
3 Existence of a Core Allocation
A necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core for a cooperative game
is given by the famous Bondareva-Shapley Theorem (see Peleg and Sudho¨lter [21]). van den
Heuvel et al. [30] apply this theorem to prove the core of the economic lot sizing game with
setup cost is nonempty. Contrary to the approach employed in van den Heuvel et al. [30],
we utilize the linear programming (LP) duality to show that the core of the economic lot
sizing game with general concave ordering cost function is nonempty.
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We first focus on the ELS games with setup cost, that is, the ordering cost function is
defined as ct(zt) = Ktδ(zt) + ctzt. In this case, it is well-known that the ELS problem can
be formulated as a facility location problem (see, for instance, Krarup and Bilde [14] for the
case without backlogging, and Pochet and Wolsey [22] for the case with backlogging).
Thus, for the ELS game with setup cost, the characteristic cost function F (S), for any
coalition S, is the optimal value of the following integer program:
F (S) := min
∑
1≤t≤T
∑
1≤τ≤T
dSτ ptτλtτ +
∑
1≤t≤T
Ktyt
s.t. dSτ
∑
1≤t≤T
λtτ = d
S
τ , ∀τ = 1, . . . , T,
λtτ ≤ yt, ∀1 ≤ t, τ ≤ T,
λtτ , yt ∈ {0, 1}, ∀1 ≤ t, τ ≤ T,
(3)
where the coefficient ptτ is the cost of satisfying one unit demand at period τ by ordering
at period t, i.e., ptτ = ct +
∑τ−1
i=t h
+
t if t ≤ τ , and ptτ = ct +
∑t−1
i=τ h
−
t if t > τ , the binary
indicator variable λtτ = 1 if and only if the demand at period τ is satisfied by the inventory
ordered at period t, and yt = 1 if and only if an order is placed at period t.
In the LP relaxation of problem (3), variables λtτ and yt are required to be non-negative,
rather than integral. It is well known that this LP relaxation has an optimal solution that
is integral (see Pochet and Wolsey [22]). This immediately leads to Theorem 1 below. The
proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward and is presented here for completeness.
For the grand coalition, i.e., when S = N , the dual of the LP relaxation of problem (3)
is
F (N) := max
∑
1≤τ≤T
dNτ bτ
s.t.
∑
1≤τ≤T
dNτ βtτ ≤ Kt, ∀t = 1, . . . , T,
bτ − βtτ ≤ ptτ , ∀1 ≤ t, τ ≤ T,
βtτ ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ t, τ ≤ T.
(4)
Then we have
Theorem 1. Assume that b¯ = (b¯1, · · · , b¯T ) is an optimal solution to dual (4), then the
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allocation l = (l1, · · · , lN) defined by
lk =
T∑
t=1
b¯td
k
t
is in the core of the ELS game (N,F ) with setup cost. Therefore, a core allocation of the
ELS game (N,F ) with setup cost can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. . By definition, ∑
k∈N
lk =
∑
1≤τ≤T
dNτ b¯τ = F (N),
Also, notice that the optimal solution b¯ = (b¯1, · · · , b¯T ) to dual (4) is clearly feasible for the
dual of the LP relaxation of problem (3), which is the same as problem (4) with dNτ being
replaced by dSτ . Therefore, for any coalition S,∑
k∈S
lk =
∑
1≤τ≤T
dSτ b¯τ ≤ F (S),
which implies that l = (l1, · · · , lN) is in the core of the economic lot-sizing game (N,F ) with
setup cost. Obviously, this core allocation can be computed in polynomial time. ¤
Now we consider the ELS game with general concave ordering cost functions ct(·), 1 ≤
t ≤ T . For each t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T and each j = 0, 1, 2, · · · , define
ct(j) = ct(j + 1)− ct(j) and Kt(j) = ct(j)− ct(j)j
Then it is clear that, by the concavity of ct(·),
ct(z) = min
j=0,1,2,···
{Kt(j) + ct(j)z}.
Thus, for the ELS game with general concave ordering cost, the characteristic cost function
F (S), for any coalition S, is the optimal value of the following integer program:
F (S) := min
∑
1≤t≤T
∑
j∈OP
∑
1≤τ≤T
dSτ pt(j),τλt(j),τ +
∑
1≤t≤T
∑
j∈OP
Kt(j)yt(j)
s.t. dSτ
∑
1≤t≤T
∑
j∈OP
λt(j),τ = d
S
τ , ∀τ = 1, . . . , T,
λt(j),τ ≤ yt, ∀1 ≤ t, τ ≤ T, j ∈ OP
λt(j),τ , yt ∈ {0, 1}, ∀1 ≤ t, τ ≤ T, j ∈ OP
(5)
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where OP = {j|j = 1, 2, · · · , DN = ∑Tt=1∑i∈N dit}, pt(j),τ = ct(j) +∑τ−1i=t h+t if t ≤ τ , and
pt(j),τ = ct(j) +
∑t−1
i=τ h
−
t if t > τ .
Therefore, we conclude that the ELS game with general concave ordering cost can be
reduced to the ELS game with setup cost. (It is known that a facility locaiton problem with
concave facility cost can be reduced to a facility location problem with setup cost; see, for
instance, Mahdian, Ye, and Zhang [15]). Theorem 1 implies that
Corollary 1. The core of the ELS game with general concave ordering cost is non-empty.
Remark 1. We studied the ELS game by using a facility location formulation for the
ELS problem. This relates the ELS game to the cooperative facility location game studied
by Goemans and Skutella [9]. Although these two games are closely related, we would like
to point out one difference between them. Roughly speaking, in the facility location game,
each demand point is a player of the game, while in the ELS game, each player may have
many demand points (demands of T periods).
Remark 2. Notice that in formulation (5), both the number of variables and the
number of constraints depend on the size of OP , which is not necessarily polynomial in the
number of periods T . Therefore, formulation (5) only gives us a pseudopolynomial time
algorithm for computing a core allocation for the ELS game with general concave cost. The
natural question is that is it possible to reduce the size of OP? For the ELS problem with
demand d = (d1, · · · , dT ), it is known that there exists an optimization solution so that
the size of each order is equal to the total demand of a number of consecutive periods.
This implies that for each concave function ct(zt), we are only interested in its values for
zt ∈ V := {z|z =
∑j
t=i dt for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ T . It is clear that the size of V (d) is
O(T 2). Thus, for each coalition S of retailers, the size of OP in formulation (5) can be
reduced to O(T 2). However, notice that the set V (d) is dependent on the demand vector
d = (d1, · · · , dT ). Thus, for each coalition S, the set V (dS) is dependent on S, so is the set
OP . That is to say, if we solve the dual problem (5) for the grand coalition N , with the size
of OP being polynomial in T , it is not necessarily true that any optimal solution is feasible
to the dual problem (5) for a coalition S ⊂ N . Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 does not go
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through.
To summarize, in this section, we have shown the existence of a core allocation for
the ELS game with general concave ordering cost. However, finding a core allocation in
polynomial time still remains to be a challenging. This motivates us to take a different
approach, which will be discussed in the next section.
4 Computing a Core allocation
The main result of this section is to show that a core allocation for the ELS game with
general concave ordering cost can be computed in polynomial time. Our algorithm is based
on a new LP formulation for the ELS problem.
Here is the outline of our approach. First, we construct a natural 0−1 integer program-
ming formulation for problem (1) where ct(·) is a general concave cost function, and show
that an LP relaxation of this integer program has an optimal integral solution. The size
of the LP relaxation is polynomial in the size of the input. Second, we construct the dual
of this LP relaxation and use the optimal dual solutions of the dual to define allocations
of the economic lot sizing game. Third, we illustrate through counterexamples that these
allocations may not be in the core of the economic lot sizing game. Fourth, building upon
the insight gained from the counterexamples, we strengthen the dual by adding additional
inequalities, and show that allocations derived from the optimal solutions of strengthened
dual are in the core of the economic lot sizing game. It then follows that a core allocation
can be computed by solving an linear program whose size is polynomial in the input of the
game.
Before presenting the natural integer programming formulation, we introduce some no-
tations. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ T , we define
dij =
j∑
t=i
dt,
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Cij(d) = min
l:i≤l≤j
{
cl(dij) +
l−1∑
t=i
h−t dit +
j∑
t=l+1
h+t−1dtj
}
, (6)
and lij be an optimal solution to (6). The integer program is then formulated as follows.
min
∑
1≤i≤j≤T
Cij(d)xij
s.t. dl
∑
i≤l≤j
xij = dl,∀ l = 1, . . . , T,
xij ∈ {0, 1}.
(7)
Proposition 2. If ct(·) is a concave function for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T , then problem (7) and
problem (1) have the same optimal objective values.
Proof. Assume that (zt, I
+
t , I
−
t ) is an optimal solution to problem (1) with the property that
there is always a regeneration period between two ordering periods. Let
R = {t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T, I+t = I−t = 0}
be the set of regeneration periods and for each t ∈ R, let n(t) be the smallest integer in R
such that n(t) > t if it exists, otherwise let n(t) = T + 1. By assumption, for each t ∈ R,
there exists exactly one ordering period between t and n(t), denoted by o(t). Then it is clear
that the optimal objective value of problem (1) is
∑
i∈R
co(i)(di+1,n(i)) +
o(i)−1∑
t=i+1
h−t dit +
n(i)∑
t=o(i)+1
h+t−1dt,n(i)
 ≥∑
i∈R
Ci+1,n(i)(d).
The right hand side of the above inequality can be represented as∑
1≤i≤j≤T
Cij(d)xij,
where for each 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ T ,
xij =
 1, if i− 1 ∈ R and j = n(i);0, otherwise.
Notice that
∑
i≤t≤j xij = 1 holds for every t. It follows that the optimal value of problem
(7) is no more than C(d).
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On the other hand, assume that xij is an optimal solution to problem (7). For each pair
(i, j) with xij = 1, we let t¯ = lij and define zt¯ = dij, I
−
k = dik, I
+
k = 0 for each k ≤ t¯ − 1,
and I−k = 0, I
+
k = dk+1,j for each t¯ ≤ k ≤ j − 1. It can be easily verified that (zt, I+t , I−t )
satisfies the constraints of problem (1), and the corresponding objective value is equal to∑
1≤i≤j≤T
Cij(d)xij. This shows that C(d) ≤
∑
1≤i≤j≤T
Cij(d)xij. The proof is complete. ¤
We relax the 0− 1 constraints of problem (7) and obtain its LP relaxation as follows.
min
∑
1≤i≤j≤T
Cij(d)xij
s.t. dl
∑
i≤l≤j
xij = dl,∀ l = 1, . . . , T,
xij ≥ 0,
(8)
whose dual is
max
T∑
t=1
btdt
s.t.
j∑
t=i
btdt ≤ Cij(d), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ T.
(9)
Here the dual variable bt can be interpreted as the price of satisfying one unit demand at
period t.
It turns out that the dual problem (9) admits a closed-form solution. In order to present
this optimal dual solution, we introduce another notation. Given T and the demand vector
d = (d1, · · · , dT ), for each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , we defined a T dimensional vector gt(d) as follows:
gt(d)i =
 di, if 1 ≤ i ≤ t;0, if t+ 1 ≤ i ≤ T.
It is clear that gT (d) = d. For each 1 ≤ t ≤ T , we define
b∗t =
C(gt(d))− C(gt−1(d))
dt
, (10)
where the function C(·) is defined in the optimization problem (1). By definition, C(gt(d))
is the minimum cost to satisfy the demand from period 1 to period t. It is clear that b∗t ≥ 0
for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T . The following result essentially implies that there exists an optimal
0− 1 solution to the LP problem (8).
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Lemma 1. The solution (b∗t ) defined by (10) is optimal to the dual problem (9), and the
corresponding optimal dual value is equal to C(d).
Proof. First of all, we show that (b∗t ) is a feasible solution to problem (9). To that end, we
notice that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ d,
j∑
t=i
b∗tdt
=
j∑
t=i
C(gt(d))− C(gt−1(d))
= C(gj(d))− C(gi−1(d))
≤ Cij(d),
where the last inequality holds since
C(gj(d)) ≤ C(gi−1(d)) + Cij(d), (11)
which in turn follows from the fact that the right hand side of (11) is the cost of a feasible
ordering policy to satisfy the demand from period 1 to period j (i.e., by ordering optimally
to satisfy the demand from period 1 and period i− 1, and ordering at a period in between i
and j to satisfy the total demand from period i to period j), while the left hand side of (11)
is the minimum cost to achieve that.
Moreover, the objective value of problem (9) associated with the solution (b∗t ) is
T∑
t=1
b∗tdt = C(g
T (d)) = C(d),
which is the optimal objective value of the integer program (7). Then it follows from the
weak duality of LP, (b∗t ) must be an optimal solution to problem (9) with an objective value
of C(d). ¤
Now we solve the dual problem for the grand coalition, i.e., we solve the following
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problem, called grand dual problem,
max
T∑
t=1
btd
N
t
s.t.
j∑
t=i
btd
N
t ≤ Cij(dN), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ T.
(12)
Assume that b¯ = (b¯1, · · · , b¯T ) is an optimal solution to problem (12). We define an allocation
l = (l1, · · · , lN) as follows:
lk =
T∑
t=1
b¯td
k
t . (13)
The grand dual problem may have multiple optimal solutions (see the following exam-
ples). Given the conceptual similarity of our approach to the linear programming duality
approach to linear production games by Owen [19], it is legitimate to conjecture that l de-
rived from any optimal dual solution b¯ = (b¯1, · · · , b¯T ) is an allocation in the core. However,
the following examples indicate that this is not the case for our economic lot sizing game.
Interestingly, our examples illustrate that some of the optimal dual solutions do give rise to
core allocations while some other optimal dual solutions do not.
Example 1. We consider the game with three periods and two players, i.e., T = 3 and
N = {1, 2}. The demands of the players are given as
d1 = (10, 0, 6), d2 = (0, 2, 0)
We assume that backlogging is not allowed. We let the holding cost for every period be zero,
and the ordering costs are defined by Ktδ(zt) + ctzt, where
K1 = 5, K2 = 9, K3 = 8, c1 = 5, c2 = 0, and c3 = 8.
It is easy to verify that b¯ = (5.5, 4.5, 0) is an optimal solution to problem (12) with dN =
(10, 2, 6) and the associated allocation (55, 9) defined by (13) is in the core. Unfortunately,
it can also be verified that b¯ = (5.5,−23.5, 91
3
) is an optimal solution to problem (12) which
gives an allocation (111,−47). Notice that if these two player does not cooperate, and player
one orders at period 1 and period 2, then the cost that player one pays is 64 which is less
than 111. Therefore, the allocation (111,−47) is not in the core.
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In Example 1, it seems that what makes the allocation (111,−47) not in the core is
the negativity of the dual variable b¯2. Lemma 1 suggests that there must exist a non-
negative optimal solution to problem (12). However, as illustrated in Example 2, adding
non-negativity constraints does not help in finding an allocation in the core.
Example 2. This example is the same as Example 1 except that we assume c2 = 1
here. Then it is easy to verify that b¯ = (5.5, 5, 11
6
) is optimal to problem (12) and provides
an allocation (62, 10), which is in the core. However, similar to Example 1, b¯ = (5.5, 0, 25
6
)
is optimal to problem (12) and defines an allocation (72, 0), which is clearly not in the core.
The above examples show that, unlike many other cooperative games studied in the
literature, we can not use an arbitrary dual optimal solution to find an allocation in the
core. Fortunately, as we shall prove below, one of the optimal dual solutions to (12) does
define an allocation in the core. To derive our main results, we notice that for every i ≤ j,
the dual constraint
j∑
t=i
btdt ≤ Cij(d) (14)
is equivalent to
j∑
t=i
btdt ≤ ck(dij) +
k−1∑
t=i
h−t dit +
j∑
t=k+1
h+t−1dtj ∀k : i ≤ k ≤ j. (15)
We can further simplify (15) by introducing some notations.
Given a vector b = (b1, · · · , bT ), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k ≤ j ≤ T , define
b−t (k) = bt −
k−1∑
l=t
h−l for each t ≤ k,
and
b+t (k) = bt −
t−1∑
l=k
h+l for each t ≥ k.
It is clear that b−k (k) = b
+
k (k) = bk for any 1 ≤ k ≤ T . Then it is straightforward to verify
that, (15), and thus (14) is equivalent to
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)dt +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)dt ≤ ck(dij) ∀k : i ≤ k ≤ j. (16)
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Lemma 2. Assume bt − h−t ≤ bt+1 ≤ bt + h+t for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. If (14) holds for
d = dN , then it also holds for any d = d′ ≤ dN .
Proof. Recall that (14), (15), and (16) are equivalent to each other. In order to prove the
lemma, it is sufficient to prove that if (16) holds for d = dN , then for every 1 ≤ l ≤ T , (16)
holds for d = d′ = dN − δel0 for some δ > 0 such that d′ ≥ 0, where el0 is the unit vector
with the l0th entry being one.
Consider a pair of indices i ≤ j. We show that (16) holds for i, j, k with i ≤ k ≤ j, and
d = d′. We assume without loss of generality that dNj > 0 and d
N
i > 0. If j < l0 or i > l0,
it is straightforward to show that (16) holds for d = d′. Hence, we focus on the case with
i ≤ l0 ≤ j. Since dNi > 0 and dNj > 0, we can choose δ > 0 such that min{dNi , dNj } ≥ δ.
Thus, dNij − δ ≥ max{dNi+1,j, dNi,j−1}. Notice that if (16) holds for i ≤ j and d = dN , then the
concavity of ck(·) implies that
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
N
t +
j−1∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
N
t + b
+
j (k)(d
N
j − δ) ≤ ck(dNij − δ) ∀k : i ≤ k ≤ j.
It follows that
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
N
t +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
N
t − δb+j (k) ≤ ck(dNij − δ) ∀k : i ≤ k ≤ j. (17)
Similarly, we have
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
N
t +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
N
t − δb−i (k) ≤ ck(dNij − δ) ∀k : i ≤ k ≤ j. (18)
Now consider any k such that i ≤ k ≤ j. By the assumption that bt − h−t ≤ bt+1 ≤ bt + h+t
for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, we get b+l0(k) ≥ b+j (k) when l0 > k and b−l0(k) ≥ b−i (k) when l0 ≤ k.
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If l0 > k, then,
ck(d
′
ij) = ck(d
N
ij − δ)
≥
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
N
t +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
N
t − δb+j (k)
≥
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
N
t +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
N
t − δb+l0(k)
=
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
′
t +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
′
t,
where the first inequality follows from (17) and the second inequality follows from the fact
that b+l0(k) ≥ b+j (k).
Similarly, if l0 ≤ k, then,
ck(d
′
ij) = ck(d
N
ij − δ)
≥
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
N
t +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
N
t − δb−i (k)
≥
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
N
t +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
N
t − δb−l0(k)
=
k−1∑
t=i
b−t (k)d
′
t +
j∑
t=k
b+t (k)d
′
t,
where the first inequality follows from (18) and the second inequality follows from the fact
that b−l0(k) ≥ b−i (k).
Therefore, we have shown that (16) holds for d = d′, which completes the proof. ¤
Lemma 3. Assume that b¯ = (b¯1, · · · , b¯T ) is an optimal solution to problem (12). If b¯t−h−t ≤
b¯t+1 ≤ b¯t + h+t for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, then the allocation l = (l1, · · · , lN) defined by
lk =
T∑
t=1
b¯td
k
t
is in the core of the economic lot-sizing game (N,F ).
Proof. Notice that for any S ⊆ N ,∑
k∈S
lk =
∑
k∈S
T∑
t=1
b¯td
k
t =
T∑
t=1
b¯td
S
t .
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Therefore, by the definition of b¯,
∑
k∈N lk is equal to the optimal value of (12), and thus
equal to F (N) by using Lemma 1.
It remains to show
∑
k∈S lk ≤ F (S) for any S ⊆ N . By weak duality of linear program-
ming, it suffices to prove that b¯ is feasible to
j∑
t=i
b¯td
S
t ≤ Cij(dS),
which is implied by Lemma 2. The proof is complete. ¤
The following lemma is key to prove our main result. It might be of independent interest
as well.
Lemma 4. Given any feasible solution b = (b1, · · · , bT ) to problem (9), we can construct in
polynomial time another feasible solution bˆ = (bˆ1, · · · , bˆT ) with the same objective value such
that −h−t ≤ bˆt+1 − bˆt ≤ h+t for every t : 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
The proof of Lemma 4 is rather long and will be presented in the appendix. Now we
provide some intuition on the inequalities in the lemma. Recall that the dual variable bi
may be interpreted as the price of satisfying one unit of demand at period i. Notice that
the demand at period i + 1 can be either satisfied by orders after period i or by an order
before period i + 1. In the latter case, period i + 1 demand is satisfied by the inventory
carried over from period i to period i+1 by paying a unit inventory holding cost h+i . Thus,
it is reasonable to expect that the charge of a unit demand at period i+ 1 is no more than
the charge of a unit demand at an period i plus the unit inventory holding cost h+i . The
inequality bˆi+1 ≥ bˆi − h−i can be explained in a similar way.
Now we are ready to present the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. For the economic lot-sizing game (N,F ) with backlogging, and with general
nondecreasing concave ordering cost, linear inventory holding cost, and linear backlogging
cost, the core is always non-empty and an allocation in the core can be found in polynomial
time.
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Proof. The non-emptiness of the core is a direct consequence of Lemma 4 and Lemma 3. In
order to show that an allocation in the core can be found in polynomial time, we notice that
by Lemma 4, an optimal solution to the following linear program
max
T∑
t=1
btd
N
t
s.t.
j∑
t=i
btd
N
t ≤ Cij(dN), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ T
bt ≥ bt+1 − h+t , ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1
bt ≤ bt+1 + h−t , ∀1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1
(19)
is also optimal to problem (12). In addition, problem (19) can be solved in polynomial time,
and any optimal solution of (19) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 3. ¤
Our approach allows us to compute allocations in the core in polynomial time. An
interesting and open question is whether the core allocations derived from our approach
allow us to construct a a population monotonic allocation scheme. Unfortunately, since
problem (19) may have multiple optimal solutions, it is not clear whether and how one
can choose the optimal dual solutions appropriately to construct a population monotonic
allocation scheme.
To illustrate the difficulty, we revisit Example 1. It is easy to verify that b¯ = (5.5, 4.5, 0)
is an optimal solution to problem (19) with dN = (10, 2, 6) and the associated allocation
(55, 9) is in the core. If one more player, player 3 with demand d3 = (0, 1, 0), joins the
game, we can verify that b¯ = (5.5, 1, 1) is an optimal optimal solution to problem (19) with
dN = (10, 3, 6) and the associated allocation (61, 2, 1) is in the core. It is interesting to
observe that the cost of player 1 actually increases while the cost of player 2 decreases. On
the other hand, b¯ = (5.5, 3, 0) is another optimal optimal solution to problem (19) with
dN = (10, 3, 6), which gives a core allocation (55, 6, 3). In this case, the cost allocations of
both player 1 and player 2 do not increase.
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5 Comparison of Different Formulations for the ELS
Game
Notice that for the ELS game with setup cost, both optimal solutions to (19) and (4) define
allocations in the core. It would be interesting to compare the set of optimal solutions of
(19) and (4).
Theorem 3. Consider the ELS game with setup cost. Let A1, A2, and A3 be the sets of
optimal solutions to problems (12), (19), and (4), respectively. Then A2 $ A3 $ A1.
Proof. First of all, notice that the constraint of (4) is equivalent to∑
1≤τ≤T
dNτ max{bτ − ptτ , 0} ≤ Kt,∀t = 1, 2, · · · , T. (20)
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ T , (20) implies that
j∑
τ=i
dNτ max{bτ − ptτ , 0} ≤ Kt, ∀t
which in turn implies that
j∑
τ=i
dNτ bτ ≤ Kt +
j∑
τ=i
dNτ ptτ ∀t.
Therefore,
j∑
τ=i
dNτ bτ ≤ Cij(dN).
It then follows that A3 ⊆ A1. Furthermore, Example 1 (where the game is an ELS game
with setup cost) shows that there exists b ∈ A1 that does not define an allocation in core.
This fact together with Theorem 1 implies A1 * A3 and thus A3 $ A1.
Now we prove A2 ⊆ A3. To this end, let b˜ ∈ A2. It suffices to show that (20) holds for
b˜. For any t, we have
(b˜τ+1 − pt,τ+1)− (b˜τ − ptτ ) = b˜τ+1 − b˜τ − h+τ ≤ 0, if τ ≥ t
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and
(b˜τ−1 − pt,τ−1)− (b˜τ − ptτ ) = b˜τ−1 − b˜τ − h−τ−1 ≤ 0, if τ ≤ t
where the inequalities follow from the fact that b˜τ+1 ≤ b˜τ + h+τ and b˜τ−1 ≤ b˜τ + h−τ−1.
Therefore, for each t, if there exists τ ≥ t such that b˜τ − ptτ < 0, then for any τ ′ ≥ τ ,
b˜τ ′ − ptτ ′ < 0; if there exists τ ≤ t such that b˜τ − ptτ < 0, then for any τ ′ ≤ τ , b˜τ ′ − ptτ ′ < 0.
Now we define χ(t) be t− 1 or the largest integer such that b˜τ − ptτ ≥ 0, whichever is larger.
Similarly, we define ψ(t) be t+1 or the smallest integer such that b˜τ − ptτ ≥ 0, whichever is
smaller.
Thus, for every t,
∑
1≤τ≤T
dNτ max{b˜τ − ptτ , 0} =
χ(t)∑
τ=ψ(t)
dNτ
(
b˜τ − ptτ
)
≤ Kt, (21)
where the inequality holds since
χ(t)∑
τ=ψ(t)
dNτ b˜τ ≤ Cψ(t),χ(t)(dN) ≤ Kt +
χ(t)∑
τ=ψ(t)
dNτ ptτ .
It follows that b˜ ∈ A3 and thus A2 ⊆ A3. Moreover, as will be seen from Example 3
(presented immediately after the proof), A2 $ A3. This completes the proof. ¤
The above theorem implies that the dual set given by (19), the set of allocations gener-
ated by the optimal dual solutions of problem (19), is a subset (indeed a true subset in the
following example) of the dual set given by problem (4). An interesting question is whether
the dual set given by problem (4) is the entire core. Unfortunately, the following example
illustrates that this is not the case.
Example 3. We consider the game with three periods and two players, i.e., T = 2 and
N = {1, 2}. Assume that backlogging is not allowed. Also,
K1 = K2 = 1, c1 = c2 = 1, d
1 = (3/4, 1/4), d2 = (1/4, 3/4).
and the holding costs are zero. In this case, we only place an order at period one. Thus,
OPT ({1}) = OPT ({2}) = 2, OPT ({1, 2}) = 3,
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and the core is {(v1, v2) : v1 + v2 = 3, 0 ≤ v1 ≤ 2, 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 2}. Solving problem (4), we get
b¯1 = 1 + δ and b¯2 = 2− δ with δ ∈ [0, 1]. Now, the dual set given by problem (4) is
{(b¯1d11 + b¯2d12, b¯1d21 + b¯2d22)} = {(5/4 + 1/2δ, 7/4− 1/2δ) : δ ∈ [0, 1]}
= {(v1, v2) : v1 + v2 = 3, 5/4 ≤ v1 ≤ 7/4},
which is a true subset of the core. In this example, for any δ ∈ [0, 1], (1 + δ, 2 − δ) ∈ A3.
But it is clear that (1 + δ, 2− δ) ∈ A2 only when δ ≥ 1/2. Thus A2 $ A3. In addition, the
dual set generated by A2 is given by
{(b¯1d11 + b¯2d12, b¯1d21 + b¯2d22)} = {(5/4 + 1/2δ, 7/4− 1/2δ) : δ ∈ [1/2, 1]}
= {(v1, v2) : v1 + v2 = 3, 3/2 ≤ v1 ≤ 7/4},
which is a true subset of the dual set given by problem (4).
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study ELS games with backlogging and with general concave ordering cost.
We show that there exists an allocation in the core, which can be computed in polynomial
time by solving a linear program.
For some cooperative games, it may be useful to study other properties of a cost alloca-
tion rule, for instance, additivity, aggregate monotonicity, coalitional monotonicity, etc.; see
Young [32] for definitions of these properties. But it is our opinion that such properties may
not be properly defined for the ELS game. Therefore, we do not discuss these properties in
this paper.
There are several directions for future research. First, although we know how to find
an allocation in the core, the problem of checking whether a given allocation is in the
core or not is still open. In particular, is there a polynomial time algorithm to check the
membership of the core or is the problem NP-hard [8]? Moreover, our focus in this paper
is the core. However, there are several other important concepts in cooperative game such
as the Shapley value [21] and the nucleolus [6]. It would be interesting to design efficient
algorithms to compute them.
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We have essentially assumed that the retailers have uniform inventory holding costs, we
also assumed that the inventory holding cost and backlogging cost are linear functions. It
would be interesting if some of these assumptions can be relaxed.
Finally, the demand is assumed to be exogenous in this paper. However, in many
practical situations, demand could be a function of the price of the product, and the price
can be optimized, together with inventory decisions, in order to maximize profit (see, for
instance, [3, 4]). It would be interesting to consider ELS games with joint pricing and
inventory decisions.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4
For a given function f : < → <, define its left-side directional derivative as
f ′−(x) = lim
δ→0−
f(x+ δ)− f(x)
δ
.
Then we have,
Lemma 5. Assume that u, v : X ⊂ < → < are two concave functions on an interval X. In
addition, u(x) ≤ v(x) for any x ∈ X. Then for any x with u(x) = v(x), u′−(x) ≥ v′−(x).
The proof of Lemma 5 is straightforward and thus omitted.
Before presenting the proof for Lemma 4, we make one observation. The inequality that
we try to prove, i.e., bt − h−t ≤ bt+1 ≤ bt + h+t for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, is equivalent to
b+t (1) ≥ b+t+1(1) and b−t (T ) ≤ b−t+1(T )
for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Given a feasible solution b = (b1, · · · , bT ) to problem (9), we convert b = (b1, · · · , bT )
to another feasible solution bˆ = (bˆ1, · · · , bˆT ) with the same objective value such that −h−t ≤
bˆt+1 − bˆt ≤ h+t for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 in two steps. In the first step, we convert b into
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a feasible solution b˜ = (b˜1, · · · , b˜T ) with the same objective value and b˜+t+1 ≤ b˜+t + h+t for
1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. In the second step, we convert b˜ into a feasible solution bˆ satisfying Lemma
4.
Step 1.
Assume that there exists some t such that bt+1 > bt + h
+
t . Let l0 be the smallest such
t. Our objective is to show that we can decrease the value of bl0+1 and increase the value of
bl0 so that bl0+1 ≤ bl0 + h+l0 . In addition, the new solution is still feasible with the objective
value unchanged, while the smallest index with bt+1 > bt+h
+
t will increase by at least 1. We
can repeat the process until bt+1 ≤ bt + h+t for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
If dl0+1 = 0, we can always decrease the value of bl0+1 and keep other dual variables
unchanged, which will not affect either the objective value or the feasibility. Thus, we assume
dl0+1 > 0 in the following analysis.
Let i0 = max{i ≤ l0 : bi+1 − bi < h+i } or i0 = 0 if the set is empty. It is clear that
i0+1 ≤ l0. Furthermore, for any i0+1 ≤ i < l0, bi+1− bi = h+i . For a given δ > 0, we define
b˜ such that for every j,
b˜j =

bj + δ, if i0 + 1 ≤ j ≤ l0;
bj − di0+1,l0dl0+1 δ, if j = l0 + 1;
bj, otherwise.
It is clear that b˜ and b have the same objective value. We shall show that there exists some
small δ > 0 such that b˜ is feasible. Specifically, we will show that for any i ≤ l ≤ j,
l−1∑
k=i
b˜−k (l)dk +
j∑
k=l
b˜+k (l)dk ≤ cl(dij), (22)
where b˜−k (l) = b˜k −
∑l−1
t=k h
−
k for k ≤ l − 1 and b˜+k (l) = b˜k −
∑j−1
t=k h
+
k for k ≥ l.
If l > l0, or j ≤ i0, or l ≤ l0 and j ≥ l0 + 1, the inequality (22) obviously holds for b˜.
Thus, we assume that max(l, i0 + 1) ≤ j ≤ l0. In this case, define
uil(x) =
l−1∑
k=i
b−k (l)dk +
j−1∑
k=l
b+k (l)dk + b
+
j (l)(x− dl,j−1), for x ∈ [dl,j−1, dlj],
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and
vil(x) = cl(di,l−1 + x).
Notice that for any i, uil(x) ≤ vil(x) for any x ∈ [0, dlT ].
We claim that uil(dlj) < v
i
l(dlj) for any i ≤ l ≤ max(l, i0 + 1) ≤ j ≤ l0. Otherwise, there
must exist i, l, j such that i ≤ l ≤ max(l, i0 + 1) ≤ j ≤ l0 and uil(dlj) = vil(dlj). Then by
Lemma 5,
b+j (l) =
{
duil−(x)
dx
}
|x=dlj ≥
{
dvil−(x)
dx
}
|x=dlj ≥
dvil−(x)
dx
, for x ∈ [dlj, dlT ], (23)
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of function vil(x). On the other hand,
it is clear that
b+l0+1(l) > b
+
l0
(l) = b+j (l). (24)
Notice that the function uil(x) is linear in (dl,j, dl,l0 ] with a slope of b
+
l0
(l) and linear in
(dl,l0 , dl,l0+1] with a slope of b
+
l0+1
(l), while vil(x) is concave. Therefore, (23) and (24) imply
that uil(x) > v
i
l(x) for x ∈ (dl,j, dl,l0+1], which contradicts the feasibility of b. Thus, uil(dlj) <
vil(dlj) for any i ≤ l ≤ max(l, i0 + 1) ≤ j ≤ l0. We can now choose δ such that
δ = min
{
min
i,l,k:i≤l≤max(l,i0+1)≤j≤l0
vil(dlj)− uil(dlj)
dmax(i,i0+1),j
, bi0 + hi0 − bi0+1
}
> 0,
if i0 ≥ 1, and
δ = min
i,l,k:i≤l≤max(l,i0+1)≤j≤l0
vil(dlj)− uil(dlj)
dmax(i,i0+1),j
> 0,
if i0 = 0. Then b˜ satisfies (22) and thus is still feasible to problem (9).
If δ < bi0 + hi0 − bi0+1 = b+i0(1)− b+i0+1(1), we claim that b˜+1 (1) ≥ . . . ≥ b˜+l0(1) ≥ b˜+l0+1(1).
If this is not true, it is clear that l0 is the smallest l such that b˜
+
l+1(1) > b˜
+
l (1). Then, similar
to the argument we used before, we can show that for i ≤ l ≤ max(l, i0 + 1) ≤ j ≤ l0,
uil(dlj) < v
i
l(dlj), where in the definition of u
j
l (·) and vjl (·), b is replaced by b˜. But this
contradicts the definition of δ.
If δ = b+i0(1) − b+i0+1(1), then b˜+i0(1) = b˜+i0+1(1) = . . . = b˜+l0(1). Therefore, the value of
max{i ≤ l0 : bi+1− bi < h+i } is decreased by at least one. In this case, if b˜+l0(1) < b˜+l0+1(1), we
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repeat the above argument by at most i0 times and each time the value of i0 will be reduced
by at least one. Then we end up with b˜+1 (1) ≥ . . . ≥ b˜+l0(1) ≥ b˜+l0+1(1).
Therefore, repeating the above argument for each l0 (at most T − 1 different values) we
end up with b˜ with b˜t+1 ≤ b˜t + h+t for t ≤ T − 1.
Step 2.
We now perform the second step by converting b˜ to bˆ satisfying the conditions of the
lemma. The procedure is similar to Step 1. Assume that there exists b˜t+1 < b˜t − h−t . Let l0
be the largest such t.
If dl0 = 0, we can always decrease b˜l0 while maintaining the same objective value until
b˜l0+1 = b˜l0 − h−l0 . In this case, we still have b˜t+1 ≤ b˜t + h+t for t ≤ T − 1. Thus, we assume
that dl0 > 0.
Let j0 = min{j ≥ l0 : b˜j+1 − b˜j > −h−j } or j0 = T is the set is empty. It is clear that
j0 ≥ l0 + 1 and for any l0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ j0, b˜i+1 − b˜i = −h−i . For a given δ > 0, define bˆ such
that for every j,
bˆj =

b˜j + δ, if l0 + 1 ≤ j ≤ j0;
b˜j − dl0+1,j0dl0 δ, if j = l0;
bj, otherwise.
It is clear that bˆ and b˜ have the same objective value. We shall show that there exists
some small δ > 0 such that bˆ is feasible, i.e., for any i ≤ l ≤ j,
l−1∑
k=i
bˆ−k (l)dk +
j∑
k=l
bˆ+k (l)dk ≤ cl(dij), (25)
where bˆ−k and bˆ
+
k are defined similarly to b˜
−
k and b˜
+
k , respectively.
If l ≤ l0, or i > j0, or l > l0 and i ≤ l0, the inequality (25) obviously holds for bˆ. Thus,
we assume that l0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ min(j0, l). In this case, we define,
ujl (x) =
l−1∑
k=i+1
b˜−k dk +
j∑
k=l
b˜+k dk + b˜
−
i (x− di+1,l−1), for x ∈ [di+1,l−1, di,l−1],
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and
vjl (x) = cl(x+ dlj).
Then we know that ujl (x) ≤ vjl (x) for any x ∈ [0, d1,l−1]. We claim that ujl (di,l−1) <
vjl (di,l−1) for any l0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ min(j0, l). Otherwise, assume that there exists i, l, and j such
that ujl (di,l−1) = v
j
l (di,l−1). Then we can show, similar to (23) and (24),
b˜−l0 > b˜
−
l0+1
= b˜−i =
{
dujl−(x)
dx
}
|x=dil−1 ≥
{
dvjl−(x)
dx
}
|x=di,l−1 ≥
dvjl−(x)
dx
, for x ∈ [di,l−1, d1,l−1].
This implies that ujl (x) > v
j
l (x) for x ∈ (di,l−1, dl0+1,l−1], which contradicts the feasibility of
b˜. Thus, ujl (di,l−1) < v
j
l (di,l−1) for any l0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ min(j0, l). We can now choose δ such
that
δ = min
{
min
i,l,j:l0+1≤i≤min(j0,l)≤l≤j
vjl (di,l−1)− ujl (di,l−1)
dl0+1,min(j0,l)
, (b˜l0+1 − b˜l0 + h−l0)
dl0
dl0,j0
, b˜j0+1 − b˜j0 + h−j0
}
> 0,
if j0 < T , and
δ = min
{
min
i,l,j:l0+1≤i≤min(j0,l)≤l≤j
vjl (di,l−1)− ujl (di,l−1)
dl0+1,min(j0,l)
, (b˜l0+1 − b˜l0 + h−l0)
dl0
dl0,j0
}
> 0
if j0 = T . Then bˆ satisfies (25) and thus is still feasible to problem (9).
Now we consider two cases.
Case 1. δ = (b˜l0+1− b˜l0+h−l0)
dl0
dl0,j0
. In this case, we have that bˆl0+1 = bˆl0−h−l0 . Therefore,
the largest integer such that bˆt+1 < bˆt−h−t has decreased by at least 1. This is exactly what
we need.
Case 2. δ < (b˜l0+1 − b˜l0 + h−l0)
dl0
dl0,j0
. In this case, bˆl0+1 < bˆl0 − h−l0 . It implies that
l0 is the largest integer such that bˆt+1 < bˆt − h−t . Then by the same argument as above,
ujl (di,l−1) < v
j
l (di,l−1) for any l0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ min(j0, l), where in the definition of ujl (·) and
vjl (·), we replace b˜ with bˆ. This would imply that δ < v
j
l (di,l−1)−ujl (di,l−1)
dl0+1,min(j0,l)
. It then follows
that δ = b˜j0+1 − b˜j0 + h−j0 . Hence we have bˆ−j0+1 = · · · = bˆ−j0 . Therefore, the value of
min{j ≥ l0 + 1 : bˆj+1− bˆj > −h−j } is no less than j0 + 1. We can repeat the procedure by at
most T − j0 times until Case 2 will not happen (and thus eventually we are in Case 1).
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The only thing that is left to verify is that bˆt+1 ≤ bˆt + h+t for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
This inequality can possibly be violated if during the process one of the following situations
happens. (Notice that for the variables increased, they are increased by the same amount.)
(1) b˜t+1 is increased by δ, but b˜t is unchanged, or b˜t is unchanged, but b˜t−1 is decreased
by a positive amount. It is clear that this can never happen in our procedure.
(2) b˜t+1 is increased by δ, but b˜t is decreased by a positive amount. This happens only
if t = l0. But after the change, bˆl0+1 = b˜l0+1 + δ, and bˆl0 = b˜l0 − dl0+1,j0dl0 δ. By the definition
of δ, bˆl0+1 = bˆl0 − h−l0 and thus bˆl0+1 ≤ bˆl0 + h+l0 .
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